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Kierkegaard on Indirect Communication, the Crowd, and a Monstrous Illusion
Antony Aumann
One thing that continues to attract people to Kierkegaard’s writings is his inexhaustible literary
creativity. Unlike many thinkers, he does not express his philosophical insights in
straightforward academic prose. He delivers them to us under pseudonyms, through narratives,
and in an ironic or humorous style. Even in his seemingly straightforward works, we find
trickery and “profound deception.” 1
Part of what makes Kierkegaard’s literary style of philosophical interest is the theory that
lies behind it, his so-called “theory of indirect communication.” The most exciting and
provocative aspect of the theory concerns the alleged importance of indirect communication. In
several places throughout Kierkegaard’s writings we find the claim that there are some ends only
indirect communication can accomplish—a claim not meant to entail the guaranteed success of
indirect communication, only its ability to do what direct communication cannot. For example, in
Concluding Unscientific Postscript to “Philosophical Fragments,” the pseudonym Johannes
Climacus claims that any attempt to communicate subjectivity or inwardness must make use of
an indirect form (CUP, 1:79, 242, 325). In The Point of View for My Work as an Author,
Kierkegaard himself argues that an “illusion” can only be removed through indirect
communication (PV, 43, 54). And in Works of Love he maintains that indirect communication is
necessary for helping a loved one achieve what is most beneficial for him or her (WL, 274).
Finally, in Practice in Christianity, the pseudonym Anti-Climacus argues that it is impossible for
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George Pattison, Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Discourses (New York: Routledge, 2002) 21. See also George
Pattison, “The Theory and Practice of Language and Communication in Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Discourses,”
Kierkegaardiana 19 (1998): 85-87.
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Christ to save all of humanity without employing indirect communication (PC, 94, 123-44). 2 I
will call the general claim contained in these passages “the indispensability thesis.”
Several commentators have objected that Kierkegaard’s acceptance of the
indispensability thesis is not rationally justified. C. Stephen Evans, for example, claims that
Kierkegaard simply exaggerates the need for indirect communication. 3 Harry Broudy questions
whether the failure of direct communication is really as inevitable as Kierkegaard makes it
sound. 4 Finally, Walter Lowrie goes so far as to suggest that Kierkegaard resorts to indirect
communication simply because of his deep, personal melancholy. 5
The purpose of this paper is to take a close, analytic look at Kierkegaard’s justification of
the indispensability thesis. To this end, I will carefully reconstruct two of the main arguments he
offers in defense of it, both of which take their departure from The Point of View. The first is
that he needs to use indirect communication to discourage people from losing themselves in the
“crowd.” The second is that he needs to use indirect communication to help people out of a
“monstrous illusion.” I do not pretend that these two arguments exhaust everything Kierkegaard
has to say in defense of the indispensability thesis. We certainly find in his writings other
interesting reasons why he needs to use indirect communication for other important purposes.
Investigating these reasons would be worthwhile. Nevertheless, the two arguments I have
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It is worth noting that we sometimes find weaker claims in Kierkegaard’s writings concerning the
importance of indirect communication. For example, in Stages on Life’s Way the pseudonymous Quidam suggests
that indirect communication is the best way—but not necessarily the only way—to prevent someone from becoming
a thoughtless follower (SLW, 344).
3
C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard’s “Fragments” and “Postscript”; The Religious Philosophy of Johannes
Climacus (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1983) 111-12.
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5
Søren Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity and the Edifying Discourse which Accompanied It, trans.
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mentioned are intriguing in their own right and, I think, can be understood in isolation. They will
be the sole focus of my paper.
My conclusion regarding these two arguments will be moderate in nature. On the one
hand, they establish that indirect communication is useful for the stated purposes and indeed
much more so than direct communication. Therefore, it is wrong to say that Kierkegaard resorts
to it simply because of his deep, personal melancholy. On the other hand, the arguments do not
establish that indirect communication is necessary for the stated purposes or that it is the only
mechanism for accomplishing them. Therefore, the arguments do not support the indispensability
thesis and the charge of exaggeration has some merit.
Kierkegaard’s Two Notions of Indirect Communication
Before turning to the arguments for the indispensability thesis, we must address a preliminary
question: what does Kierkegaard mean by the term “indirect communication”? The unfortunate
truth is that it is not altogether clear. Kierkegaard never provides us with a coherent definition,
only a number of disjointed discussions of the topic. 6 Nevertheless, I believe that we can
organize his comments in a productive manner. In this section I will attempt to do so.
My account will pull from a variety of Kierkegaard’s writings, both pseudonymous and
signed. This begs the notorious question regarding how to treat the pseudonymous texts.
Kierkegaard famously requests that we not attribute to him the views found in them (CUP,
1:[627]). I will adopt the following response to this request. We must distinguish between two
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This fact has led some to claim that Kierkegaard does not have a coherent theory of indirect
communication. See Benjamin Daise, Kierkegaard’s Socratic Art (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1999) 30;
and Poul Lübcke, “Kierkegaard and Indirect Communication,” History of European Ideas 12/1 (1990): 32. It has led
others to claim that the phrase “indirect communication” is an honorific term, one that refers to any kind of
communication that Kierkegaard deems important. See Lars Bejerholm, Meddelelsens Dialektik: Studier i Søren
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communication. For a discussion of this issue, see Antony Aumann, “Kierkegaard on the Need for Indirect
Communication” (PhD diss., Indiana University, 2008) 25-29.
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notions of attribution. On the one hand, to attribute a view to me can simply mean that I came up
with it. This is a matter of giving me credit for an original idea or an original way of putting an
idea. On the other hand, to attribute a view to me can involve the further claim that I actually
believe it. This is a matter of identifying where I stand on a particular issue. Notice that it is
possible to make the former kind of attribution without making the latter. For example, I can
attribute to my colleague a powerful way of presenting a position that I am not sure he or she
ultimately believes. This is the attitude I will take up regarding Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous
texts. I will assert that Kierkegaard came up with the views found in them but deny that they
necessarily represent his own opinions. 7
Some people might object that projects such as mine suffer from a special, heightened
version of the problem posed by the pseudonyms. I aim to develop a Kierkegaardian theory by
pulling from a number of different pseudonymous texts. This practice, some might say, is akin to
piecing together words from the mouths of so many characters in Shakespeare’s plays. It does
violence to the differences between the worldviews that the various characters occupy; it
homogenizes what is in fact heterogeneous.
While I concede there is a potential problem here, I fail to see why it necessarily arises.
Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms do indeed occupy different life-views. However, we cannot say a
priori that these life-views are incommensurable on every point. It is possible at least in principle
that they agree on some topics. To settle the matter, we must do the difficult work of digging
through the texts, finding the positions articulated by the different pseudonyms, and examining
whether they fit together. If we find a coherent view, then the practice of piecing together
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I am not alone in taking up this response to Kierkegaard’s request. For others who adopt it or something
like it, see Steven M. Emmanuel, “Reading Kierkegaard,” Philosophy Today 36/3 (1992): 241; Evans,
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passages from different pseudonymous texts is legitimate. If we find incoherence and
contradiction, then it is not. As for the case in point, I believe that when we do the requisite work
with respect to the topic of indirect communication we find a coherent set of views. The
following is my account of those views.
There are basically two ways in which Kierkegaard talks about indirect communication.
On his first way of talking about the term, “indirect communication” refers roughly to Socrates’
midwifery or maieutic method. 8 Importantly, Kierkegaard does not identify the midwifery
method with the Socratic elenchus, the specific practice of engaging in an adversarial dialogue
with someone by asking questions about the person’s beliefs. 9 He identifies it instead with the
more general pedagogical strategy that the elenchus instantiates. The defining feature of this
general strategy is that the teacher does not explicitly tell the learners the truth but rather helps
them discover or “give birth” to it for themselves (PF, 10-13). To use Kierkegaard’s
terminology, the midwife helps other people “stand alone” in the learning process (JP, 1:650,
section 15; cf. WL, 275). In contemporary parlance we might say that the midwife promotes
active learning or discovery learning.
The difficulty here concerns precisely how to understand the process by which the
teacher encourages discovery learning. Under what conditions does Kierkegaard think it occurs?
That is to say, under what conditions does he think that the teacher successfully engages in
indirect communication in this first sense?
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See JP, 1:109; JP 1:653, section 24; JP 6:6783; CUP, 1:277; OMWA, 7. For Socrates’ account of himself
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For a discussion of the elenchus, see Gregory Vlastos, “The Socratic Elenchus,” The Journal of
Philosophy 79/11 (1982): 711-14.

6
The secondary literature contains a diversity of views on this matter. Far and away the
dominant approach is to describe the relevant conditions in terms of the degree to which the
learner is active in the pedagogical process. Among the scholars who adopt this approach there
are two camps. Members of the first camp say that indirect communication occurs whenever the
learner is active at all in the pedagogical process. 10 The threshold here is obviously quite low.
After all, even the most passive kind of learning requires some amount of uptake on the part of
the learner. As a consequence, those who take this approach tend to categorize all or almost all
communication as indirect communication.
Commentators who belong to the second camp of interpretation find this consequence
unacceptable. They point out that neither Kierkegaard nor any of the pseudonyms state that all or
almost all communication is indirect communication. In fact, Johannes Climacus suggests that
direct communication is the norm (CUP, 1:74). Members of the second camp conclude that there
must be restrictions on the kind of activity on the part of the learner that counts. In particular,
they maintain that indirect communication occurs only if the learner actively reflects on the
implications and ramifications for his or her own life of the knowledge he or she acquires. In
other words, it occurs only if the teacher prompts the learner to engage in what Climacus calls
subjective thinking or subjective reflection (see CUP, 1:73-76, 192-203). 11
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This restriction, however, strikes me as somewhat ad-hoc. I see no obvious reason why
this particular kind of activity matters while other kinds do not. 12 I grant that Kierkegaard almost
always talks about indirect communication in situations where the learner must appropriate the
content of the communication into how he or she lives his or her life. However, I believe this fact
says more about Kierkegaard’s specific pedagogical goals than it does about the nature of
indirect communication. Such appropriation is what Kierkegaard wants to bring about in his
readers by way of his use of indirect communication. But it is not therefore the only thing
someone can bring about by way of indirect communication. Indeed, we can find passages in
Kierkegaard’s corpus describing cases where indirect communication does not serve this end at
all (see, e.g., CUP 1:277-78).
I find it more helpful and more exegetically accurate to describe the conditions under
which something counts as indirect communication (in the first sense) in terms of the degree to
which the learner depends on the teacher. I submit the following definition. Indirect
communication (in this first sense) occurs if and only if
(1) the teacher provides some relevant form of guidance to the learner; but
(2) the learner does not depend on the teacher’s authority for the justification of the
knowledge acquired or the decision made as a result of the learning process; and
(3) the learner does not depend on the teacher for the content of the knowledge acquired
or the decision made as a result of the learning process (i.e. the teacher does not
explicitly or implicitly tell the learner what he or she is supposed to learn or decide). 13
12

Notice also that if Kierkegaard stipulates that indirect communication occurs whenever the learner
engages in subjective reflection, then the case for the indispensability thesis is easily made. Perhaps too easily for
our satisfaction. It follows simply by definition that indirect communication is indispensable for the task of getting
the learner to engage in subjective reflection.
13
This account bears some rough similarities to the one developed by Poul Lübcke (see “Kierkegaard and
Indirect Communication,” 31-40). Lübcke, however, focuses on the task of helping the learner make a decision and
not that of helping the learner acquire knowledge. I wish to cast a wider net.
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Some comments about these conditions are in order. The first condition is included in order to
rule out the possibility that someone could engage in indirect communication without saying
anything or even doing anything remotely communicative. 14 Not only would this be an
intuitively strange result, it is one that Climacus seems to reject in Concluding Unscientific
Postscript (CUP, 1:65-66). The second condition is drawn from the early pages of Philosophical
Fragments. There Climacus praises Socratic midwives precisely because they do not serve as
authority figures for other human beings (PF, 10-12). This strongly suggests that not serving as
an authority figure is an important part of being a midwife. The third condition comes from
Practice in Christianity. Here Anti-Climacus states that the indirect communicator does not tell
the learner exactly what the outcome of the learning process is supposed to be. Instead, the
indirect communicator provides the learner with a puzzle or problem that the learner must figure
out for himself or herself (PC, 133; cf. CUP, 1:242).
We can sharpen our understanding of this kind of indirect communication by looking at a
paradigmatic instance of it: Either/Or. This book contains what amounts to a debate between two
fictional characters, A and Judge William, over the merits of their respective life-views. An
important feature of the book is that it does not contain a conclusion to the debate (see CUP,
1:252-54). It does not end with one character acknowledging the superiority of the other’s lifeview. Nor does the fictional editor, Victor Eremita, step in to render an impartial judgment. In
addition, lest readers try to learn who is supposed to win by looking to the life-view of the actual
author, Kierkegaard publishes the book under a pseudonym. He even goes so far as to deceive
the citizens of Copenhagen into thinking that he is a loafer or idler who lacks the motivation and
drive necessary for writing such a book (PV, 58-63). The purpose of these tactics is to force

14
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certain things and thus provide the learner with some guidance.

9
readers to figure out for themselves which life-view wins and why. 15 In this way, conditions (2)
and (3) above obtain. Nevertheless, readers are not left entirely without guidance. Either/Or
offers a rich account of the two competing life-views, one that lays bare their various drawbacks
and advantages. This account enables readers to make an informed but still nonetheless
independent judgment about which life-view is superior. Thus, condition (1) obtains as well.
So much for Kierkegaard’s first way of talking about indirect communication. On his
second way of talking about the term, “indirect communication” refers not to a general
pedagogical strategy but rather to the use of specific artful literary devices. Chief among the
relevant devices is pseudonymity. However, it is not the only device on the list. Kierkegaard also
includes deception, humor, irony, ambiguity, fictional narratives, and “imaginative
constructions.” 16
It is worth noting at this point that the distinction between this second way of talking
about indirect communication and the first way often gets obscured in Kierkegaard’s writings.
The reason is that Kierkegaard often uses artful literary devices when engaging in the midwifery
method, as seen in the case of Either/Or. Nevertheless it is important to respect the difference
between the two ways of talking about indirect communication. There are at least two reasons
why. First, Kierkegaard sometimes categorizes the use of artful literary devices as indirect
communication without regard for whether this use occurs in the service of the midwifery
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See CUP, 1:296-97; PC, 133; Lübcke, “Kierkegaard and Indirect Communication,” 36.
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method. In other words, he sometimes applies the label in question to the use of artful literary
devices in contexts where the midwifery method is simply not under discussion. 17 Second,
Kierkegaard explicitly states that his upbuilding discourses do not count as indirect
communication even though they are maieutic in nature. He justifies this statement by pointing
out that the discourses do not exhibit the use of certain artful literary devices, in particular
pseudonymity (JP, 1:656; 6:6701). 18 The implication is that, at least here, he is reserving the title
of “indirect communication” for writings that do exhibit the use of such devices. From these two
pieces of evidence, I draw the conclusion that the second way of talking about indirect
communication picks out a distinct way in which Kierkegaard employs the term. Hence, it
requires independent treatment.
The main problem with the second way of talking is that it is difficult to develop a
helpful definition of “artful literary devices.” An intensional definition is a non-starter.
Kierkegaard does not tell us what essential feature all and only artful literary devices share such
that using them counts as indirect communication. Nor does it seem feasible for us to come up
with a list of features on our own by abstracting away what all of the relevant devices have in
common.
Another option is an extensional definition. We can say that the expression “artful literary
devices” refers to those devices the use of which Kierkegaard explicitly calls indirect
communication. This definition has obvious drawbacks. It does not tell us what to say about
devices Kierkegaard does not discuss. Nor does it satisfy our curiosity as to why he picks out all
17

For an extended discussion of passages in Kierkegaard’s writings where this occurs, see Aumann,
“Kierkegaard on the Need for Indirect Communication,” 30-57.
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literary devices. See Pattison, “The Theory and Practice of Language and Communication,” 85-87; Kierkegaard’s
Upbuilding Discourses, 12-34.
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and only the devices that he does. Nevertheless, an extensional definition does provide enough
information to determine the meaning of the indispensability thesis. To wit, indirect
communication (in the second sense) is indispensable if and only if there are some projects we
can accomplish only by way of one of the literary devices the use of which Kierkegaard
designates as indirect communication. Since analyzing the indispensability thesis is the main
goal of this paper, the extensional definition provides us with what we need.
In the end, Kierkegaard says exciting and provocative things about both kinds of indirect
communication. He ultimately maintains that both are indispensable for his purposes.
Nevertheless, the use of pseudonyms, humor, deception, fiction, etc. is somewhat more
conspicuous in his writings than the use of the midwifery method. In addition, he provides a
more explicit defense of the indispensability of this kind of indirect communication. Therefore,
this is where I will focus my attention in the rest of the paper.
Indirect Communication and the Crowd
One argument that Kierkegaard sets forth regarding the need for indirect communication and that
has received some mention in the secondary literature concerns a criticism Kierkegaard levels
against modern society. 19 The criticism is that people lose themselves in the “crowd” instead of
becoming “single individuals.” What this means is that they frivolously and thoughtlessly accept
the judgments of others instead of carefully coming to conclusions by and for themselves
(UDVS, 127-37; TA, 90-94). They lack the courage to make a decision—especially one having
to do with ethics and religion—without simply deferring to public opinion on the matter. 20
19

See Emmanuel, “Reading Kierkegaard,” 252; Evans, Kierkegaard’s “Fragments” and “Postscript,” 106;
John Lippitt, Humour and Irony in Kierkegaard’s Thought, 25-26, 136; Mooney, “Kierkegaard, Inwardness, and
Belief,” 135-37; and George Pattison, Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious, 2nd ed. (London: SCMCanterbury Press, 1999) 69-73.
20
TSI, 108; JP, 3:2964; JP, 3:3229; and JP, 4:4941. For discussions of the problem of “the public,” see Pat
Cutting, “The Levels of Interpersonal Relationships in Kierkegaard’s Two Ages” in International Kierkegaard
Commentary: Two Ages, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1984) 78, 82; Nerina Jansen,
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People fear making decisions for themselves because it opens up certain undesirable
possibilities. That is to say, it brings into play certain unpleasant situations that would otherwise
not be in play. Two in particular are worthy of note. First, if you make a decision for yourself,
you might not end up making the same decision as other people. You therefore might not enjoy
the natural comfort that comes with human solidarity (JP, 4:4885). Moreover, you might
experience the discomfort of persecution or peer pressure (TSI, 120; UDVS, 136). After all,
other people also want to enjoy the comfort of solidarity. If you do not share their opinion, you
inhibit them from enjoying this comfort fully. Thus, they will be well-motivated to pressure you
into conforming to their views. Second, if you make decisions for yourself, you bear the
responsibility for those decisions (UDVS, 132-33). Thus if you happen to decide wrongly, you
will be subject to blame. The blame might come from other people. But, even more frightfully, it
might come from God or from yourself in the form of the voice of conscience (UDVS, 128-29).
The mere threat of such possibilities brings with it the uneasiness of anxiety.
Kierkegaard claims that people think they can avoid these undesirable possibilities by
following the crowd (UDVS, 128; JP, 3:2968). They believe that if they follow the crowd, they
will not have to worry about missing out on the comfort of solidarity. Nor will they have to
worry about suffering the discomfort of persecution and peer pressure. Finally, they will not have
to worry about the possibility of becoming blameworthy or the accompanying feeling of anxiety
(UDVS, 128-29). For they believe they will be able to deflect responsibility for their decisions
onto the crowd, as we see paradigmatically in the case of the person who appeals to the fact that
“everyone does it” as an excuse (TSI, 107).

“The Individual versus the Public: A Key to Kierkegaard’s Views of the Daily Press” in International Kierkegaard
Commentary: The Corsair Affair, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1990) 1-21.
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Kierkegaard grants that following the crowd provides a number of psychological
comforts. But he denies that it enables people to avoid responsibility for their actions and beliefs.
He offers two reasons for this denial. First, the crowd does not exist in and of itself. It is an
abstract object like a class or a set. As such, it is identical with the individuals that comprise it. It
is not some thing over and above them (TSI, 108; TA, 90-93). Because the crowd is not a distinct
ontological entity, it cannot be responsible without the people who comprise it being responsible.
Those who think they can avoid responsibility by passing the buck to the crowd overlook this
point. They implicitly attribute a greater ontological status to the crowd than it actually has. They
blame some thing that is not really there (TSI, 108; TA, 91).
Second, even if the crowd were a distinct ontological entity, the people who followed the
crowd would not avoid responsibility entirely. Such people would still be responsible for their
decision to go along with the crowd in the first place. For Kierkegaard maintains (perhaps too
optimistically) that the pressure to follow the crowd is never entirely coercive. We are always
free to go it alone. Since we can break with the crowd, we are responsible for our decision not to
do so. This is in part what Kierkegaard means when he says, “How you act and the responsibility
for it is finally wholly and solely yours as an individual.” 21
Nevertheless, following the crowd might still allow people to ignore the fact that they are
responsible. In other words, even though following the crowd does not actually allow people to
avoid responsibility, they might wrongly believe that it does. And if they hold such a belief, they
will not see themselves as responsible when they follow the crowd.
This is a serious problem in Kierkegaard’s eyes. He views owning up to one’s
responsibility for how one acts and what one believes as an essential part of ideal human
21

Søren Kierkegaard, Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing: Spiritual Preparation for the Office of
Confession, trans. Douglas V. Steere (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1956) 189. I depart from the Hong and Hong
translation here for the sake of emphasis.

14
existence. Indeed, to become “the single individual,” which he so often praises as the highest
goal in life, involves inter alia being clearly and continually conscious of one’s responsibility as
a moral and religious agent (UDVS, 127; TSI, 117; OMWA, 10). Accordingly, Kierkegaard
wants to get people to see that following the crowd does not allow them to avoid personal
responsibility. Short of that, he wants to discourage people from actually following the crowd so
that they cannot use this as an evasion tactic in order to avoid acknowledging personal
responsibility for their lives. Finally, as a first step in this whole process, he wants to thwart
people from following him in particular. After all, following him would just be another token of
the same problematic type as following the crowd. This final point brings us to one main purpose
of Kierkegaard’s artful literary devices. They push his readers away, encouraging or even forcing
them to “stand alone” (JP, 1:653, sections 23-24; SLW, 344-45).
Textual support abounds for the idea that indirect communication serves to create
distance between author and reader. In Concluding Unscientific Postscript to “Philosophical
Fragments,” Johannes Climacus suggests that the indirect communicator does not induce people
to go the same way as he or she does, but rather urges them to go their own way:
Indirect communication makes communicating an art in a sense different from what one
ordinarily assumes it to be…To stop a man on the street and to stand still in order to
speak with him is not as difficult as having to say something to a passerby in passing
without standing still oneself or delaying the other, without wanting to induce him to go
the same way, but just urging him to go his own way. (CUP, 1:277)
Elsewhere Climacus asserts that the aim of indirect communication is to set readers free (CUP,
1:74). He also says that such communication “establishes a chasmic gap between reader and
author and fixes the separation of inwardness between them” (CUP, 1:263). For still further
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support, we can look at how Kierkegaard actually employs his artful literary devices. His use of
pseudonyms, for example, inhibits readers from learning whether he himself endorses the views
contained in his books. And his use of “imaginative constructions”—the thought experiments he
develops in a hypothetical or subjunctive mood—achieves the same end by making it unclear
whether he actually stands behind what he says.
Let us grant, then, that Kierkegaard uses indirect communication to push people away
and discourage them from depending on him. The question remains: does he need artful literary
devices for this purpose? Are such devices indispensable for this purpose? I doubt it. As Vanessa
Rumble points out, Kierkegaard could push readers away with a straightforward or direct
communication. 22 He could, for example, simply tell them not to depend on him. In fact,
Kierkegaard follows this procedure in his signed writings. We read in the preface to each set of
Upbuilding Discourses: “[This little book] is called ‘discourses,’ not sermons, because its author
does not have the authority to preach, ‘upbuilding discourses’, not discourses for upbuilding,
because the speaker by no means claims to be a teacher” (EUD, 5). 23 And, in the preface to For
Self-Examination, we read: “My dear reader, read aloud, if possible…. By reading aloud you
will gain the strongest impression that you have only yourself to consider, not me, who, after all,
am ‘without authority’, nor others, which would be a distraction” (FSE, 3; cf. JFY, 91-92). It
seems likely that these straightforward requests will discourage at least some people from
depending improperly on Kierkegaard. If so, indirect communication is not the only way to
accomplish this end.
There are two ways someone might try to rescue the idea that artful literary devices are
indispensable for heading off improper dependence. First, someone might say that we have
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Rumble, “To Be as No-One,” 311, 313-14.
See also EUD, 53, 107, 179, 231, 295.
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underestimated the depth of the problem. Kierkegaard worries about people who will depend on
him even though he does not want them to do so. 24 Simply telling such people that he does not
want them to depend on him will not make a difference (and, presumably, neither will explaining
to them why they should not do so). Kierkegaard must use more drastic measures. He must
actually prevent these people from figuring out what position he endorses in the first place.
This is an important point. But it does not rescue the idea in question. Even if we grant
that Kierkegaard must hide his own position from his readers, it is unclear why doing so requires
the use of special literary or rhetorical devices. For instance, he could say in perfectly plain
language, “I do not necessarily advocate the lifestyles I describe.”
Second, someone might try to rescue the idea that artful literary devices are needed to
head off improper dependence by raising the following objection. A straightforward attempt to
push people away – e.g. simply telling people not to depend on you – seems to involve a
performative contradiction. When you straightforwardly encourage someone to stand alone, you
actually discourage that person from standing alone with respect to one particular decision, viz.
the higher-order decision about whether or not to stand alone. With respect to this higher-order
decision, you actually give the person a rhetorical push toward one option—which is the exact
opposite of letting the person stand alone. Therefore, if you want the person to stand alone with
respect to everything, including the higher-order decision about whether or not to stand alone,
you contradict yourself by straightforwardly encouraging him or her to stand alone. And perhaps
that is why someone who wants to encourage people to stand alone must turn to indirect
communication (cf. CUP, 1:75)
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Ideally, people will not even desire to become Kierkegaard’s followers and thus revealing his views will
not matter. However, Kierkegaard does not write for an ideal audience. He writes for those who actually are inclined
to depend on him in an inappropriate manner. The suggestion here is that accommodating the flaws of his readers
requires the use of a special strategy.
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We can sharpen this objection by putting it in slightly different terms. Kierkegaard wants
to leave it up to his readers to decide for themselves how to live their lives. However, some of
his readers might decide that they want to live their lives as Kierkegaard’s followers. Their
thoughtful and honest decision might be to become Kierkegaardians and do whatever he does.
By straightforwardly pushing these people away, Kierkegaard discourages them from choosing
this option. But that means he has not left it entirely up to them to decide how to live their lives.
And thus he has not done what he wants to do.
We can deal with this objection as follows. First, it is not clear that the objection actually
applies to Kierkegaard. He does not maintain that the learner should stand alone unconditionally
or with respect to everything. He only maintains that the learner should stand alone with respect
to ethical and religious decisions. This qualification opens up room for giving straightforward
rhetorical pushes elsewhere and, in particular, with respect to the higher-order decision about
whether or not to stand alone when making ethical or religious decisions. Once such room exists,
the aforementioned contradiction goes away.
Someone might counter that the higher-order decision in question is itself an ethical or
religious decision. Thus the above-mentioned qualification does not help and the objection
against using direct communication returns. Under this interpretation, however, turning to
indirect communication does nothing to improve matters. Hiding behind a pseudonym or writing
in a subjunctive mood also encourages readers to make decisions for themselves. For it prevents
them from knowing what the author believes and thus prevents them from becoming his or her
followers. In this way it too favors one of the options facing the person making a higher-order
decision about whether or not to stand alone. This, of course, is the same consideration that led to
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a performative contradiction above in the case of direct communication. Therefore, by the same
reasoning, it will lead to one here in the case of indirect communication.
In summary, we have identified one purpose for which Kierkegaard uses indirect
communication: encouraging people to make ethical and religious decisions for themselves.
However, we have not established that indirect communication is the only way to accomplish
this purpose. In fact, on one interpretation, it runs aground on the same problem as direct
communication. Thus, we have not proven the indispensability thesis here.
A Monstrous Illusion
I suggested in the introduction that Kierkegaard offers us a second reason for turning to indirect
communication (understood as the use of artful literary devices). To get at this reason, we will
have to look closely at one faction of his target audience. Our inspection will reveal that this
faction suffers from a very peculiar problem (in addition to that of wanting to follow the crowd).
Thinking about the nature of this problem will shed light on why Kierkegaard thinks he must use
indirect communication to address his audience. 25
The standard way to describe the problem plaguing Kierkegaard’s target audience is to
refer to his assertion that it suffers from “a monstrous illusion [uhyre Sandsebedrag]” (PV, 41). 26
The illusion is that Denmark is a Christian nation, a country in which “all are Christians.” To say
that the members of the audience suffer from the illusion is to say that they buy into this
25

In this section, I explain why Kierkegaard thinks his audience suffers from self-deception. In the
following section, I explain why he thinks addressing self-deception requires the use of indirect communication. The
details in each case have to do with Christianity. However, nothing hangs on these details. Kierkegaard’s argument
as to why addressing self-deception requires the use of indirect communication would apply to any case of selfdeception. Those not interested in Christianity can substitute a case that suits their purposes.
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falsehood. They consider themselves and each other Christians when in fact they are not.
Kierkegaard calls this unfortunate state-of-affairs “Christendom” (PV, 41-44).
It is tempting to think that the problem here is one of ordinary ignorance. The relevant
story might run as follows. Kierkegaard’s audience never learned and thus does not know what it
really takes to be a Christian. It operates under some well-meaning but ultimately erroneous
standard. According to this erroneous standard, everyone does qualify as a Christian; the
appearance that all are Christians is not misleading but an accurate reflection of the truth. Thus
the members of Kierkegaard’s audience fall prey to the illusion simply because they do not know
any better.
Kierkegaard does not accept this story. He does not believe that his audience suffers from
ordinary ignorance. As he sees it, the facts of the matter are clear and no honest person could
entertain the idea that all are Christians. He says:
Everyone who in earnest and also with some clarity of vision considers what is called
Christendom, or the condition in a so-called Christian country, must without any doubt
immediately have serious misgivings. What does it mean, after all, that these thousands
and thousands as a matter of course call themselves Christians! These many, many
people, of whom by far the great majority, according to everything that can be discerned,
have their lives in entirely different categories, something one can ascertain by the
simplest observation! People who perhaps never go to church, never think about God,
never name his name except when they curse! People to whom it has never occurred that
their lives should have some duty to God... That there must be an enormous underlying
confusion here, a dreadful illusion [frygteligt Sandsebedrag], of that there can surely be
no doubt. (PV, 41)
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Thus Kierkegaard thinks that the members of his audience know better than to do what they are
doing. They know they should not call their way of living “Christianity,” but they do so anyway.
We can elaborate on what it means to say Kierkegaard’s audience “knows better” by
picking up on a distinction Climacus draws in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. The
distinction concerns the difference between “abstract Sunday-understanding” and the concrete
understanding of the rest of the week (CUP, 1:469). On Sundays, when they listen to the pastor
preach, the Danish citizens grasp the concept of Christianity accurately. They realize that it picks
out a set of strenuous behaviors. In particular, they understand that living a Christian life
involves denying oneself, loving one’s neighbor, following the paradigm of Christ, etc. On the
other six days of the week, however, they fail to engage in these behaviors. They do not practice
self-denial; they do not love their neighbors; and they do not follow the paradigm of Christ. Yet
they still call themselves Christians. They thereby betray that they understand the concept of
Christianity differently during the week than they did on Sunday. It no longer picks out a set of
strenuous behaviors. It picks out something more trivial—like being a citizen of Denmark or
having a baptismal certificate at home in a drawer (CUP, 1:367). In sum, when Kierkegaard’s
fellow Danes use the concept of Christianity during the week, they water down its meaning.
However, given their acquaintance with the proper meaning of the concept, this use or rather
misuse of the concept cannot qualify as an honest mistake. It cannot be the result of simple
ignorance. They know better than to talk this way. 27

27

A tangential question arises here concerning what really makes Climacus upset. On the one hand, it
might be that Climacus objects to what he sees as the improper use of Christian language during the week. He might
believe there is some objectively correct way to use Christian language that people learn about on Sundays yet fail to
employ during the week. On the other hand, it might be that Climacus simply dislikes the inconsistency between the
Sunday understanding of Christianity and the weekday understanding. On this reading, Climacus would be perfectly
happy if people embraced the weekday understanding—if only they would openly reject the Sunday understanding.
James Conant embraces the latter option. He claims that “Kierkegaard would have no dispute at all with someone
who actually thinks one can be a Christian simply by being a citizen” (“Putting Two and Two Together,” 274).
Admittedly, Climacus sometimes talks this way: “But one of the two must be a jest: either what the pastor says is a
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Examples of this phenomenon abound in Kierkegaard’s writings. A particularly
illuminating one arises in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Here Climacus describes a Sunday
sermon on the Christian principle that “a man is capable of nothing” (CUP, 1:467). The idea here
is not that the powers and abilities human beings appear to have are illusory. It is rather that such
things are not of their own making. Whatever powers and abilities they possess come from God.
(We can think of this as an instance of the general principle set forth in the Epistle of James:
“every good gift and every perfect gift is from above.” 28 ) The existential upshot of this idea is
that people ought not to think highly of themselves or to become self-important because they
have certain abilities. They should humbly acknowledge that in and of themselves they can do
nothing; they need God’s help to do even the least thing. In this respect, they are no better than
anyone else (CUP, 1:467). 29
Climacus says that the sermon was easy to understand and that everyone grasped exactly
what the pastor meant (CUP, 1:467). Still, he decides to send a spy out among the people to
discover how they interpret the message during the rest of the week. After numerous run-ins, the
spy reports his findings:
And so it goes, for six days of the week we are all capable of something. The king is
capable of more than the prime minister. The witty journalist says: I will show so-and-so
what I am capable of doing—namely, make him look ridiculous. The policeman says to

jest, a kind of parlor game one plays at times and bears in mind that a human being is capable of nothing, or the
pastor must indeed be right when he says that a person must always bear this in mind – and the rest of us, the pastor,
and I, too, are wrong in that we exegete the word ‘always’ so poorly” (CUP, 1:471). However, I think the former
option outlined above is the better one. I think Climacus believes there is an objectively correct way to use Christian
language. Evidence for this position comes from the passages where he accuses people of turning Christianity into
something it is not (CUP, 1:369-81). It would be impossible to turn Christianity into something it was not if there
were no objective truth regarding what Christianity is. Thus, passages such as the one just quoted should not be read
straightforwardly but rather as a kind of rhetorical posturing.
28
James 1:17 (King James Version)
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Kierkegaard discusses this principle at some length in his signed discourses. See EUD, 321-26; CD, 298300.
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the man dressed in a jacket: You very likely do not know what I am capable of doing—
namely arrest him. The cook says to the poor woman who comes on Saturdays: You
apparently have forgotten what I am capable of doing—namely, of prevailing upon the
master and mistress so that the poor woman no longer receives the leftovers of the week.
We are all capable of something, and the king smiles at the prime minister’s capability,
and the prime minister laughs at the journalist’s, and the journalist at the policeman’s,
and the policeman at the blue collar worker’s, and the blue collar worker at the Saturdaywoman’s—and on Sunday we all go to church (except the cook, who never has time,
because on Sunday there is always a dinner party at the councilor’s house) and hear the
pastor declare that a human being is capable of nothing at all—that is, if by good fortune,
we have not gone to a speculative pastor’s church.
But wait a minute. We have entered the church; with the help of a very capable
sexton (for the sexton is especially capable on Sundays and with a silent glance indicates
to so-and-so what he is capable of doing), each of us takes a place in relation to one’s
specific capability in society. Then the pastor enters the pulpit—but at the last moment
there is a very capable man who has come late, and the sexton must demonstrate his
capability. Then the pastor begins, and now all of us, from our respective different seats
and points of view, understand what the pastor is saying from his elevated standpoint:
that a human being is capable of nothing at all. (CUP, 1:470)
Here we have an example of what it means to say that the members of Kierkegaard’s audience
“know better.” On the one hand, they do understand Christianity. For on Sunday they hear,
understand, and acknowledge the truth that they cannot do anything without God’s help. On the
other hand, they act as if they do not understand Christianity. For during the rest of the week they
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take every opportunity to ascribe power first and foremost to themselves and to become selfimportant—yet still call themselves Christians.
At this point, an interesting set of questions arises. Why does this inconsistency persist?
Why do people continue to misuse Christian language if they know better? Why do people
continue to claim “all are Christians” if they can “ascertain by the simplest observation” that no
one lives Christianly?
The striking answer is that people want to misuse language in this way; they want the
illusion to remain in place. Thus Kierkegaard says the delusion [Indbildning] exists because the
people are deluding themselves [indbilder sig] (OMWA, 8n**). In other words, the illusion
[Sandsebedrag] is actually a case of self-deception [Selvbedrag]. 30
Admittedly, Kierkegaard often accuses the pastors of encouraging the illusion (JP,
3:3620; TM, 136). But the people are not any less blameworthy as a result. For the pastors are
simply giving them what they want (CUP, 1:478). And, as Kierkegaard starkly puts it in Judge
for Yourself!, the people want to be deceived:
Yes, it is true that people will very readily blame the proclaimers of Christianity and seek
fault in them (and this may well be the way to become the Christian public’s favorite);
but it is perhaps rather the Christian public, which because of the fear of men (to which
the proclaimers certainly should not yield) forces the proclaimers to deceive this
Christian public… The world wants to be deceived; not only is it deceived—ah, then the
matter would not be so dangerous!—but it wants to be deceived. Intensely, more
intensely, more passionately perhaps than any witness to the truth has fought for the truth,
30

Although there is a slight difference in meaning, Kierkegaard tends to use the words “illusion
[Sandsebedrag]” and “delusion [Indbildning]” interchangeably. Evidence for this claim comes from the following
passage in The Point of View for My Work as an Author: “On the assumption that Christendom is an enormous
illusion [Sandsebedrag], that it is a delusion [Indbildning] on the part of the multitude who call themselves
Christians, in all probability the illusion [Sandsebedrag] we are discussing here is very common” (PV, 48).
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the world fights to be deceived; it most gratefully rewards with applause, money, and
prestige anyone who complies with its wish to be deceived. (JFY, 139-40; see also TM,
45; CD, 170-71)
Here we can see the truth of our initial suggestion that the problem is not one of ordinary
ignorance. It is rather one of willed ignorance. The people do not want to overcome their
confusion, their inconsistency, and their misuse of language. They want to maintain a lack of
clarity about themselves and their lives (CD, 181).
Of course, this conclusion begs another set of questions: Why do the members of
Kierkegaard’s audience want to misuse language? Why do they want the illusion to remain in
place? Why do they want to be deceived?
Kierkegaard answers these questions obliquely in part three of Christian Discourses (CD,
163-87). He says that people want to be deceived because owning up to the truth would force
them to make a decision they desperately want to avoid. If they owned up to the truth, either they
would have to stop calling themselves Christians or they would have to change how they live
their lives. But they do not want to do either of these two things. On the one hand, they want the
psychological benefits of calling themselves Christians. They want to be able to say of
themselves and their loved ones that they are doing what, as far as they are concerned in a
Christian nation and a Christian era, is the highest thing a human being can do. On the other
hand, they want to enjoy comfortable, easygoing, cozy, aesthetic lives (cf. CUP, 1:85). They do
not want to engage in the constant struggle and strain of the Christian life with its demand of
self-denial and its promise of suffering (CD, 171, 179). Thus, we can see how Kierkegaard’s
audience is well-motivated to cover up the distinction between the Christian-religious mode of
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existence and the aesthetic mode of existence—a distinction that, in some sense, they already
recognize.
Indirect Communication and the Monstrous Illusion
Armed with this understanding of the problem plaguing Kierkegaard’s audience, we can now
investigate the claims he makes about how to accommodate it. The thrust of these claims comes
out clearly in the following passage: “An illusion can never be removed directly, and basically
only indirectly [kun grundigt indirekte]. If it is an illusion that all are Christians, and if
something is to be done, it must be done indirectly” (PV, 43). We find a similar message a few
lines later:
On the assumption, then, that a religious author has from the ground up become aware of
this illusion, Christendom, and to the limit of his ability with, note well, the help of God,
wants to stamp it out [vil det tillivs]—what is he to do then? Well, first and foremost no
impatience. If he becomes impatient, then he makes a direct assault and accomplishes—
nothing. By a direct attack he only strengthens a person in the illusion and also infuriates
him. (PV, 43; cf. PV, 53)
To summarize these two passages, we can say that Kierkegaard believes indirect communication
is indispensable for the task of removing an illusion. 31 That is, he believes only indirect and not
direct communication can stamp it out.
To see why Kierkegaard’s position might make sense, we need to understand what he
means by a “direct” approach. Although he does not explicitly say so, we are led to believe he
means “direct” in the sense of blunt talk and straight shooting, i.e. in the sense of avoiding
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deceptive, ironic, and otherwise elusive speech. Thus someone who approached the illusion
directly would, for example, tell the Danish people that (1) there is a distinction between the
Christian-religious mode of existence and the aesthetic mode of existence, (2) they have
intentionally confused the two, and (3) they lie to themselves when they profess to be
Christians. 32
In an important passage from The Point of View for My Work as an Author, Kierkegaard
describes what will happen to someone who engages in such a direct communication:
Every once in a while a religious enthusiast appears. He makes an assault on
Christendom; he makes a big noise, denounces nearly all as not being Christians—and he
accomplishes nothing…First and foremost, [the people] pay no attention to him at all, do
not read his book but promptly lay it ad acta [aside]; or if he makes use of the Living
Word, they go around on another street and do not listen to him at all. Then by means of
a definition they smuggle him outside and settle down quite securely in their illusion.
They make him out to be a fanatic and his Christianity to be an exaggeration—in the end
he becomes the only one, or one of the few, who is not a Christian in earnest (since
exaggeration, after all, is a lack of earnestness); the others are all earnest Christians. (PV,
42-43)
Why does Kierkegaard think things will turn out this way? Given what we now know, the
answer is not hard to come by. The religious enthusiast (the direct communicator) and the target
audience are at cross-purposes. In particular, the audience wants to obfuscate or conceal what the
direct communicator wants to bring to light, viz. the difference between the Christian-religious
mode of existence (which the audience says it chooses) and the aesthetic mode of existence
32

I do not pretend that this example captures the only way to engage in direct communication in this
context. However, I do maintain that anything that warrants the label “direct communication” here will bear some
kind of family resemblance to the example I provide.
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(which it actually chooses). Consequently, if the direct communicator comes right out and
announces the agenda, the audience will work against him or her. It will see the direct
communicator coming and arm its defenses appropriately.
Notice that the opposition between the direct communicator and the target audience does
not result from a factual or theoretical disagreement. In some sense, the audience knows and
accepts what the direct communicator has to say about the difference between the aesthetic and
Christian-religious modes of existence. It understands that Christianity involves more than being
a citizen or having a baptismal certificate at home in a drawer. The opposition between the two
parties arises at the next point, the point of determining what to do about these facts. The direct
communicator wants to bring them to light and the audience wants to cover them up. Thus,
Kierkegaard says that what the members of his audience really want to avoid is a showdown, i.e.
a situation in which they would have to take the speaker seriously (JP, 1:516). For if they had to
take the speaker seriously, they would have to admit to themselves and each other that the
speaker was right, which is the last thing they want to do.
Granting that the direct approach faces these obstacles, what is the alternative approach
that allows us to avoid them? That is to say, what does the indirect approach look like? Curiously
enough, Kierkegaard tells us that the indirect approach to removing an illusion [Indbildning or
Sandsebedrag] involves the use of deception [Bedrag]: “One can deceive a person out of what is
true, and—to recall old Socrates—one can deceive a person into what is true. Yes, in only this
way can a deluded person [et Menneske, der er i en Indbildning] be brought into what is true—
by deceiving him [at bedrage ham]” (PV, 53). The purpose of the deception is to prevent the
deluded audience from realizing what the communicator has up his or her sleeve. The hope is
that the communicator will thereby avoid setting off the audience’s defense mechanisms and
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hence gain the opportunity to make the audience aware of what it does not want to be made
aware of (PV, 44, 54).
In order to make sense of what Kierkegaard is saying here, it is crucial to recognize that
he is only speaking about one small part of a larger story. The project of making the audience
aware of the truth about the aesthetic and religious ways of life is a complex one. It requires
providing the audience with a new and more accurate vision of these alternatives, one more
attuned to their subtle and often hidden drawbacks and advantages. Among other things this will
involve helping the audience come to see in a more profound way how the aesthetic life suffers
from despair and how the religious life offers an important but difficult way out. None of these
things can be done quickly or easily. However, the first step in the process is to capture the
audience’s attention. It is for this step that a deception is necessary.
Now Kierkegaard recommends that the deception follow what we might crudely call a
“bait and switch” pattern. The teacher should not begin by talking about what he or she
ultimately wants to talk about (PV, 54). As noted, such an approach would repel the audience.
Instead, the teacher should begin by talking about what would interest the audience. The idea
here is for the teacher to “make a big splash” with the members of the audience or to establish a
rapport with them (PV, 44, 54). Then, once the audience’s attention has been captured, the
teacher is to switch over to what he or she ultimately wants to talk about. The hope is that the
teacher will thereby force the audience to see what it does not want to see (PV, 44, 54).
We can fill out our understanding of Kierkegaard’s notion of a “bait and switch”
deception by exploring three concrete examples. Perhaps the most important one comes from
Kierkegaard’s own early (pre-1847) authorship. 33 Somewhat controversially, 34 Kierkegaard
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asserts that he does not begin his early authorship by talking about what he ultimately wants to
discuss, namely the essential character of the religious life (PV, 54). He attempts instead to
establish a rapport with people by writing in a way they will find interesting (PV, 44). Having
thereby gained the attention of his target audience, he makes the switch. The result is that “the
religious is introduced so quickly that that those who, moved by the esthetic, decide to follow
along are suddenly standing right in the middle of the decisive qualifications of the essentially
Christian” (OMWA, 7n*).
The precise details of how Kierkegaard carries out the bait-and-switch deception in his
early authorship are unclear. One hypothesis is that Either/Or is the bait. The switch to the
religious then occurs in the Two Upbuilding Discourses, which are published three months later.
Support for this theory comes from an anecdote in The Point of View for My Work as an Author.
The anecdote concerns an acquaintance who, presumably after reading Either/Or, came to
believe that Kierkegaard was witty and clever. Hoping for more of the same, the acquaintance
bought the Two Upbuilding Discourses. However, he encountered something quite unexpected:
the religious (PV, 36; cf. OMWA, 9).
The problem with this first hypothesis is that it presumes people saw through the
pseudonymity of Either/Or. It presumes they recognized Kierkegaard was responsible for this
book. Yet such recognition is precisely what Kierkegaard worked so very hard to prevent (see,
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e.g., PV, 60-62). We thus get the strange picture that he needed readers to think he wrote
Either/Or in order to carry out the deception but tried to thwart them from doing so. 35
In order to avoid this absurdity, I favor a different hypothesis. The bait and switch takes
place entirely within Either/Or. Kierkegaard lures people in with the first volume and, in
particular, with the spectacular “Seducer’s Diary.” He then makes the switch to the religious in
the “Ultimatum” at the end of the second volume, which speaks about the “uplifting” idea that
“in relation to God we are always in the wrong” (EO, 2:339). 36
A second example of the kind of bait-and-switch deception under discussion occurs in
Philosophical Fragments (CUP, 1:274n*). 37 Here Climacus tries to attract the attention of the
Danish Hegelians by pretending to engage in a bit of speculative philosophy. His ruminations
focus on the learner’s paradox found in the Meno. He first examines the solution to the paradox
provided by the Socratic theory of recollection. He then imagines an alternative solution that
“goes further” than the Socratic position—something the Hegelians were wont to do (PF, 20,
24). Quite stunningly, the new hypothesis turns out to look just like orthodox Christianity—so
much so that he even imagines someone accusing him of plagiarism (PF, 35). Thus what started
out as a bit of novel theorizing ends up as one more reading of “the old familiar text handed
down from the fathers” (CUP, 1:[629-630]; WA, 165). Climacus has baited his audience by
pretending to talk about things that interest them, only to switch in the end to talking about what
interests him.
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One final example that deserves mention is the parable the prophet Nathan tells King
David in II Samuel 11:2-12:15. 38 Kierkegaard discusses this passage at some length in For SelfExamination, where, following his customary practice, he retells the story for his own purposes
(FSE, 37-39). We can summarize his rendition as follows. The narrative begins with King
David’s committing adultery with Bathsheba and subsequently having her husband murdered.
Nathan learns of David’s misdeeds and desires to get the unrepentant king to acknowledge the
error of his ways. But Nathan does not proceed straightforwardly. Instead, he approaches David
with a little story he has written so that the king, “a connoisseur, an expert in matters of taste,”
can judge it:
There lived two men in a certain city. The one was very rich and had great herds of
livestock, large and small, but the poor man had only a little lamb that he had bought and
raised and that had grown up with him together with his children. It ate from his hand and
drank from his cup, and it was like a child in his home. But when a traveler came to the
rich man, he spared his livestock, large and small, and took the poor man’s sheep,
slaughtered it, and prepared it for the stranger who had come to him. (FSE, 38)
David listens to the story and makes some comments about its structure and style. Then,
suddenly, with David still caught up in the aesthetic aspects of the story, Nathan changes his
tone: “Thou art the man.” The transition has its desired effect; David sees the error of his ways
and repents (cf. CD, 235-236).
Conclusion Regarding the Indispensability Thesis
We can now take stock of this second argument for the indispensability thesis. We have
established two things. First, the use of direct communication to help people out of selfdeception faces a serious obstacle. Second, indirect communication provides a way around this
38
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obstacle. That is not to say indirection is infallible, nor does Kierkegaard suggest as much (PV,
49). The point is just that indirect communication can avoid a serious difficulty that plagues
direct communication.
Are these two points strong enough to support Kierkegaard’s indispensability thesis? To
recall, the indispensability thesis states that indirect communication can accomplish some task
that direct communication simply cannot. For this thesis to hold, direct communication must
necessarily or inevitably fail at the task in question. To wit, it must necessarily or inevitably fail
at removing self-deception. We have seen that Kierkegaard makes a claim to this effect (PV, 43).
But does the evidence at hand support it? I believe it does not. Let me explain why.
Kierkegaard’s account reveals that the obstacle facing direct communication stems from
a conflict of desires. The audience wants the opposite of what the direct communicator wants. In
particular, it wants to obscure the truth that the direct communicator wants to bring to light. But
why should we believe that the audience will necessarily or inevitably win this conflict? Why
should we believe that, just because the audience wants the direct communicator to fail, he or she
will fail? For all we know there are cases where, perhaps simply out of dogged perseverance, the
direct communicator succeeds at making the audience aware of the truth even though the
audience does not want to be made aware of it. Of course, it might turn out that there are no such
cases. It might turn out that, just as a matter of brute fact, the audience always triumphs. But that
is not something Kierkegaard or anyone else can establish a priori.
Now we do have a posteriori evidence that speaks against the efficacy of direct
communication when it comes to removing self-deception. History furnishes us with no shortage
of examples here. However, even if we were to discover that every previous attempt at direct
communication had failed at this task, we still would not have a strong enough case for the
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indispensability thesis. We still could not rule out the possibility that these failures occurred
because the direct communicator gave up too soon. Moreover, we could not rule out the
possibility that the tide would turn in favor of direct communication in the future. As long as
these possibilities remain in play, we strictly speaking cannot conclude that the failure of direct
communication is necessary or inevitable.
In conclusion, the considerations explored in the second half of this paper do not support
the indispensability thesis. Still we must take care less we overstate the point. Two qualifications
are worth mentioning in particular. First, our investigation has not shown that the
indispensability thesis is false, only that the specific reasons Kierkegaard offers us in the Point of
View do not establish its truth. The possibility of proving the thesis on other grounds remains
open. Second, the results of our investigation do not entail that indirect communication is
useless. On the contrary, we have seen that indirect communication is a very fruitful strategy for
removing self-deception. Indeed it is far superior to the direct approach. The problem is just that
the indispensability thesis sets a higher bar. It states that indirect communication provides the
only way to accomplish some task, not just the best way to do so. Nothing we have examined in
this paper supports a claim quite this strong.

